The notion of Zero Knowledge Proofs (of knowledge) [ZKP] is central to cryptography; it provides a set of security properties that proved indispensable in concrete protocol design. These properties are defined for any given input and also for any auxiliary verifier private state, as they are aimed at any use of the protocol as a subroutine in a bigger application. Many times, however, moving the theoretical notion to practical designs has been quite problematic. This is due to the fact that the most efficient protocols fail to provide the above ZKP properties for all possible inputs and verifier states. This situation has created various problems to protocol designers who have often either introduced imperfect protocols with mistakes or with lack of security arguments, or they have been forced to use much less efficient protocols in order to achieve the required properties. In this work we address this issue by introducing the notion of "protocol portability," a property that identifies input and verifier state distributions under which a protocol becomes a ZKP when called as a subroutine in a sequential execution of a larger application. We then concentrate on the very efficient and heavily employed "Generalized Schnorr Proofs" (GSP) and identify the portability of such protocols. We also point to previous protocol weaknesses and errors that have been made in numerous applications throughout the years, due to employment of GSP instances while lacking the notion of portability (primarily in the case of unknown order groups). This demonstrates that cryptographic application designers who care about efficiency need to consider our notion carefully. We provide a compact specification language for GSP protocols that protocol designers can employ. Our specification language is consistent with the ad-hoc notation that is currently widely used and it offers automatic derivation of the proof protocol while dictating its portability (i.e., the proper initial state and inputs) and its security guarantees. Finally, as a second alternative to designers wishing to use GSPs, we present a modification of GSP protocols that is unconditionally portable (i.e., ZKP) and is still quite efficient. Our constructions are the first such protocols proven secure in the standard model (while the previously known efficient constructions relied on the Random Oracle model).
Introduction

Motivation
Zero knowledge proofs [32] [ZKP], and zero knowledge proofs and arguments of knowledge in particular, are a central tool in cryptosystem and protocol design. These tools allow a designer to enforce parties to assure others that they take specified actions consistent with their internal knowledge state [30] . Properties of ZKP are defined over all inputs i.e., they provide security and correctness properties independently of input distribution. A shortcoming of ZKP's is that depending on the underlying language it can be hard to come up with efficient protocols. This has lead to the design of specialized protocols for specific language classes that occur often in applications. A celebrated example that has proven to be very useful in the design of efficient cryptographic schemes is known as Generalized Schnorr Proofs (extending the original seminal proof [44] to various algebraic settings like unknown order modular groups that arise in the context of the RSA cryptosystem). These protocols are at the heart of many efficient cryptographic systems and have been employed in a great number of schemes including: anonymous e-cash, anonymous voting, group signatures, distributed signing, distributed decryption, verifiable encryption, fair exchange, ring signatures, and credential systems. These schemes capitalized on the high efficiency of Schnorr's method and constitute, perhaps, the most extensive application of zero knowledge theory to practice so far. Further, a shorthand notation introduced in [15, 16] for GSP has been extensively employed in the past and contributed to the wide employment of these protocols in cryptographic design. This notation suggested using e.g., PK(α : y = g α ) to denote a proof of the discrete logarithm log g y and it appeared in many works to describe quite complex discrete logarithm based relations, e.g., [3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 28, 29, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51] . What has been often overlooked though is the fact that Generalized Schnorr Proofs are not zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge! This is a consequence of the fact that the security properties of such protocols are affected by the input distribution of the involved parties. Interestingly, despite the long line of works in the proper formalization of zero-knowledge proofs, this aspect has been largely overlooked, mainly due to the fact that it is only critical from an application-oriented efficiency point of view rather than a theoretical feasibility point of view. Let us illustrate the phenomenon with two examples: Example 1. Consider the language L = { n, g, h, y | ∃s, t : y = g s h t mod n} ⊆ L in = N 4 k where N k is all k-bit numbers and the following variation of the standard Schnorr proof: the prover sends the value u = g s 0 h t 0 for some random integers s 0 , t 0 ; upon receiving u the verifier responds with some integer c and finally the prover responds with s 1 = s 0 − c · s and t 1 = t 0 − c · t (calculated over the integers). The verifier returns 1 if and only if u = y c g s 1 h t 1 mod n. This protocol has been used numerous times (see e.g., [27, 16, 1] ). However the protocol is not a proof of knowledge: on the one hand, in the case that the factorization of n is easy, it is feasible to design a knowledge extractor that in expected polynomial time can recover the witness to the statement when interacting with any convincing prover. Nevertheless such extractor can only succeed for certain choices of y as the above protocol can make the verifier accept with high probability even for "malformed" y's that satisfy y = ζg s h t where ζ is a small order element of Z * n . Furthermore, when the factorization of n is difficult, the knowledge extractor cannot even take advantage of Chinese remaindering to process the values submitted by the prover; in such case ensuring the verifier that a convincing prover is indeed in possession of a witness becomes even more elusive. In addition, observe that the zero-knowledge property is affected by the way the protocol is executed, and in particular the statistical zero-knowledge aspect of the above protocol depends on the relative sizes of s 0 , s and t 0 , t. Example 2. Consider the language L = { n, g, y | ∃s, r : y = g s 2 h r }. A way for designing an efficient protocol for this language is to have the prover provide a commitment C = g s h r and then prove simultaneously the knowledge of the commitment C as well as the commitment C s using two instances of the protocol in example 1. Clearly, in this case we will have to deal with similar issues as in example 1, but furthermore we will have an additional difficulty to simulate the value C as part of the zero-knowledge simulator. For choices of the values of g, h, n where h happens to be a subgroup of Z * n different than g it can be the case that C is not sufficiently hiding its g s component. For example h can be the subgroup of quadratic residues in Z * n and g a quadratic non-residue; this choice would be leaking one bit about the committed value s.
The above two cases exemplify the fact that there are many efficient protocols that are not zero-knowledge proofs but they may potentially be used as such as long as they are employed over a suitable input generation. It follows that given the state of the art what is badly missing is a methodological, i.e, a formal way to guide cryptographic protocol designers under what conditions (on input and verifier's state) it is safe to deploy these efficient protocols as subroutines in a larger application context. Identifying such safety conditions and attaching them to a protocol is what we call "identifying the protocol's portability. " We say that a protocol is portable with safety conditions defined by a class of input generators, for the class over which it retains the properties of zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. The lack of properly identifying this notion has created a number of crucial protocol problems on previously published works. For example, the work of [27] has been cited extensively and its results were used directly to justify the proof of knowledge properties of various proposed schemes. This was done without realizing that some of the security arguments in [27] are incorrect, which was finally noticed (and corrected but without providing a formal protocol framework) by Damgård and Fujisaki [24] five years after the publication of the original paper. Further, in various cases the possibility of a biased input generation and reference string contribution by one of the parties was not considered (either in the model or as an omission or as an oversight) and this led to other works pointing out actual problems in these cases. For example, see the attack of [17] on [1] that illustrates how a malicious key generation leads to a soundness attack in the underlying signing protocol that, in turn, enables a framing attack in the group signature scheme. Another example is the attack of [34] on [5] that takes advantage of a malicious parameter generation to break the zero-knowledge property of the protocol construction. In both cases the required properties can be preserved by ensuring proper parameter generation (as it was argued in [2] and [5] respectively). These previous problem instances highlight the need of having a proper formalism that identifies conditions for porting efficient protocols as zero-knowledge proofs.
Our Contributions
1. We introduce the notion of portability for proofs of knowledge protocols which identifies input and initial constraints under which a protocol can be employed and have the zero-knowledge proof properties. First, we define the notion of an input-generator for a proof protocol and we formalize the properties of soundness and zero-knowledge conditional on a given input generator. The portability of the protocol is defined, in turn, by identifying classes of input generators for which the protocol is sound and zero-knowledge (thus, can be deployed safely). Note that unconditional portability characterizes protocols that retain their properties for any input distribution (i.e., this notion coincides with regular zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge).
2. We then identify a large class of input generation and soundness parameters over which Generalized Schnorr Proofs (GSP) are portable. This clarifies the correct way to employ the highly popular protocol description notation introduced in [15, 16] for GSP mentioned above. Based on our results the (frequently lacking and often erroneous) security analysis of all these previous works is streamlined and presented in a unified way. Indeed, the notation PK(α, . . . : y = g α , . . .) was originally suggested for a few specific protocols without clear semantics and syntax for the notation nor with a way to derive a concrete protocol for the notation. Subsequently, the notation was extended by many authors and was also used in different (algebraic) settings thereby opening gaps between statement made in the notation and the security properties offered by the protocol that the authors seemingly had in mind. Sometimes, the notation has also been used with no particular protocol in mind but just to describe any protocol (e.g., a generic zero-knowledge proof protocol) that proves knowledge of a witness to the statement. This leads to our next contribution.
3. We introduce a new notation PKspec for specifying GSP proofs that puts forth the soundness guarantees provided by the protocol specified by it. Our notation can be used as a black-box in protocol design and the respective security proofs. To illustrate our notation, as an example, consider two parties that jointly compute the values U, V, n such that U, V ∈ Z * n and one of them wishes to demonstrate a certain structural relationship between them. This goal will be specified syntactically in the following way (for example):
Note that the specification is divided into two parts, the one appearing in the first line is what the protocol designer (ideally) wishes to ensure and the second is what will actually be ensured by the Schnorr protocol (in particular, the values ζ 1 , ζ 2 will be selected from some small subgroup and the range [L , R ] may be extended compared to [L, R]). Based on our work, a protocol designer may write a GSP specification as above and then rely on our analysis for the proof of a security and soundness (which assures portability of the GSP protocol to his/ her specific context).
4. To complete the tool kit for protocol designers, we introduce an efficient extension of GSP protocols that is unconditionally portable. This construction is proven correct and secure in the standard model, whereas the only previously known efficient protocols -known as the class of Σ + protocols [5] -were shown secure in the random oracle idealization.
5. The identification of portability for Generalized Schnorr Proofs facilitates the correct and secure design of efficient protocols. To illustrate the power of our framework in this context we consider two well-known cryptographic constructions from different subareas. We show how the employment of our GSP framework clarifies their design and the assumptions they depend on, and assures their security while coping with previously presented attacks. We first consider the original scalable group signature scheme by Ateniese et al.
[1] mentioned earlier. Recently, [17] presented an attack (which is actually based on considering the extended setting of dishonest group manager at the system's setup phase, something not originally anticipated; see [2] for a discussion). Employing the GSP framework, in turn, allows us to clarify the settings where the protocol of [1] is secure and highlights the exact requirements on the joint input to the proof of knowledge. As a side benefit our framework also shows how the scheme can be made more efficient. Next, we consider the efficient divisible e-cash scheme of Chan et al. [18] ; the security of this scheme was never analyzed properly (and originally the scheme as published had problems). Employing our GSP framework here, we reveal the exact cryptographic assumptions required for the modified scheme to be secure (something that even the corrected version [19] has been lacking).
How to use the results of this paper in cryptographic protocol design
Here we comment briefly on the way our results can be used in cryptographic design. Suppose that in a certain cryptographic system a party is required to execute a proof that involves a series of discrete-log relations expressed in the widely used ad-hoc PK notation. Using Theorem 10 the designer can obtain the corresponding PKspec expression and, by the same theorem also automatically get the GSP protocol implementing the proof. Then the designer examines the input generation that preceeds the protocol which is defined by the system execution until the moment the GSP protocol should be invoked; if the conditions of Theorem 10 are satisfied then the soundness and the zero-knowledge property are implied immediately. If on the other hand, the conditions of Theorem 10 are not met, then the designer may use the unconditionally portable transformations of GSP protocols presented in section 6. For two concrete examples the reader can refer to section 7.
Preliminaries
Notations. A function f : N → R is called negligible if for all c ∈ R there exists ν 0 ∈ N so that for all ν ≥ ν 0 it holds that f (ν) < ν −c . When a random variable x is distributed according to the probability distribution X with support S we will write Prob x←X [x = s] for the probability that x takes the value s ∈ S. Let x, y be two random variables with the same support S(ν) distributed according to the probability distributions X(ν), Y (ν) where ν ∈ N. We say that x, y are statistically indistinguishable if the function f (ν) :
If m ∈ N we will use the notation [m] to denote the set {0, . . . , m − 1}. In general we will denote by L some language typically over alphabet {0, 1} unless otherwise specified. If L is an NP language, R L will be the corresponding polynomial-time relation, i.e., L = {φ | ∃w :
Interactive Protocols. Let Π = (P, V ) be a protocol where P, V are probabilistic interactive Turing machines (ITM). The view of P in Π is a random variable that contains all messages exchanged with V as well as the contents of all tapes of P . Two protocols Π 1 = (P 1 , V 1 ), Π 2 = (P 2 , V 2 ) can be concatenated if we execute first (P 1 , V 1 ) and then write the private outputs of P 1 , V 1 to the input tapes of P 2 , V 2 respectively and start the execution of (P 2 , V 2 ). We allow parties to output a special symbol ⊥ to signify that they "reject" a certain interaction. In the context of sequentially composed protocols, producing a ⊥ symbol at some intermediate stage would signify that a party refuses to continue with the execution (and the final output of the party becomes ⊥ which may interpreted as reject in the context of zero-knowledge proofs). For a given protocol Π = (P, V ) we will say that the two ITM's V, V are indistinguishable provided that in the context of the Π interaction it is impossible for any adversarial P to distinguish whether it is communicating with V or V (the notion is defined similarly for the case of the ITM's P, P ).
Portability of Zero-Knowledge Proofs
A zero-knowledge proof protocol Σ = (P, V ) for a language L enables P to demonstrate to V that a joint input t belongs to an NP language L provided that the prover possesses a witness w such that (t, w) ∈ R L . Soundness and zero-knowledge of such protocols should hold for any input distribution. Here we consider the (non-limiting) case that the prover and the verifier collaboratively construct the input t to the proof protocol by engaging in a protocol Π (dubbed the "input-generator"); at this preamble stage we denote the two parties by P in , V in to highlight their relation with the actual prover and verifier. The output of this preamble stage will be the input to the actual prover and verifier.
Consider Π, a two-party protocol Π = P in , V in where each party may reject returning ⊥ while if P in terminates successfully it returns a pair t, w P and similarly V in returns t , w V where t, t ∈ L in . The protocol Π is called an input generator for L, if for all executions that neither party returns ⊥ it holds that (t, w P ) ∈ R L and t = t .
Next we define statistical zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge over input generators. The definition follows the standard ZK notion with the only difference being that the input instead of being totally adversarial (i.e., universally quantified) is produced by an input generator protocol Π. The parties are allowed to be adversarial during this input generation stage. In particular for soundness we allow the prover to bias the input generation and in formalizing soundness the knowledge extractor will be interacting with the malicious prover in both stages (with rewinding power only during the second stage, i.e., the proof system). Regarding zero-knowledge we condition on all input generation executions that the honest prover agrees to execute the proof system and we require the existence of a simulator that can simulate the view of any malicious verifier. Note further that to support design flexibility we will allow the prover to show that the input belongs to a possibly extended language L ext .
Definition 2
The two party protocol Σ = P, V is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge over the input generator Π = P in , V in for L with knowledge error parameters (L ext , κ) and zero-knowledge distance if these properties are satisfied: (1) Completeness: it holds that both P in and V in terminate successfully with overwhelming probability and subsequently V accepts the interaction with the prover P with overwhelming probability. (2) Soundness: For any pair of (P * in , P * ) we denote by π P * in ,P * the probability that P * convinces V on inputs generated by P * in and V in (where π P * in ,P * is taken over the entire probability space of (P * in , V in ), (P * , V )). We say that Σ is sound over Π, if there is some K in , such that: (i) K in and V in are indistinguishable as ITM's, (ii) for any P * there is some K for which it holds that for any P * in : K on input the view of K in and the output of P * in , it returns w such that (t, w ) ∈ R L ext where t is the statement that is determined in the input generation stage between P * in and K in with probability of success at least c · π P * in ,P * where c ∈ R while running in time polynomial in (π P * in ,P * − κ) −1 . (3) Zero-knowledge: Σ is statistical ZK over Π, if there exists an S in , such that (i) S in and P in are indistinguishable as ITMs, (ii) for any V * , there is a simulator S, such that for any V * in : the random variable that equals the view of V * when interacting with P on input generated by P in , V * in is distinguishable with distance at most from the random variable that equals the output of S given as input the view of S in and the output of V * in . We next introduce the notion of portability of a protocol:
Definition 3 The two party protocol Σ = P, V is said to be portable over the class of input generators W if for all Π ∈ W it holds that Σ a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge over Π. If W contains all possible protocols then the protocol Σ is said to be unconditionally portable.
Ensuring portability from semi-honest behavior. Suppose that a given protocol happens to be a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for some input-generator Π as long as the prover and the verifier are semi-honest at the input generation stage. In such an occasion one can generically compile a protocol Σ * from Π and Σ so that Σ * becomes a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge over Π using the transformation from semi-honest to malicious behavior put forth in [30] (see also [31] , section 7.4). Note that while this is feasible, it is not particularly efficient given that it requires expensive steps such as coin-flipping combined with generic zero-knowledge proofs to ensure that no party is deviating from the input distribution (recall that much of cryptographic protocol design is motivated by avoiding generic inefficient tools). Our results will demonstrate that such generic techniques can be substituted by much more efficient ones for the particular class of protocols we consider (i.e., generalized Schnorr proofs).
Comparison to common-reference-string/bare model ZK. Zero-knowledge proofs are sometimes modeled in the common-reference string model, cf. [23] (or the common random string model, [43] ); in this setting there is an explicit separation between the input of parties and the reference string that is assumed to be honestly generated and provided to the parties. A common-reference-string ZK protocol is supposed to satisfy the security properties conditional on the distribution of the reference string that no party can bias. By comparison, in our setting there is no unbiased reference string that is independent of the proof's statement that can be used to assist in the proof of soundness or zero-knowledge. While here we deal mainly with the bare model, it is worth noting that even the availability of a common reference string does not eliminate the issues of context dependent contributed inputs. Relaxed Knowledge Extraction. In our formulation, the knowledge extractor only ensures that the prover possesses knowledge of a witness showing that t belongs to an extended language L ext . If L = L ext the soundness definition will ensure that the interactive input belongs to L (as in the standard definition of ZK), however we will also consider slightly different languages L ext . The reason for this relaxation is that by extending the language one may obtain more efficient protocols which is our primary concern. Naturally this will allow the prover to convince the verifier to accept despite the fact that the interactive input may be in the "gray area" L ext − L. Note that in principle we will always be able to modify the interactive input proof of knowledge so that L = L ext (if one does not mind the additional computation overhead that will be incurred). Sigma Protocols. Our applications will focus on protocols P, V that are called Σ-protocols, i.e., a three-move protocol in which the prover goes first, the verifier responds with a random challenge from {0, 1} k , the prover responds, and finally the verifier either accepts or rejects based on the prover's response. All conversations in a Σ-protocol are of the form com, c, res (commitment, challenge, response). These protocols typically consider the setting where the verifier is restricted to be "honest" during the interactive proof P, V when proving the zeroknowledge property. While we will follow this, however, we will still allow the verifier to be totally adversarial in the input building stage. This is justified as the honest verifier setting can be transformed using numerous techniques to the fully adversarial verifier setting (e.g. see [41, 23] ) and these techniques readily apply to our setting. Variations of the definition. In our definition we focused on knowledge extraction following the definition of [6] (note that in our protocols the knowledge error will be κ = 2 −k where k is a parameter). Moreover we formulated zero-knowledge in the statistical sense. It is easy to reformulate the definition by strengthening zero-knowledge (e.g., perfect zk) or relaxing it (e.g., computational zk). Moreover, soundness can be relaxed to require only language membership from the prover (instead of knowledge extraction), or defined with a specialized knowledge extractor that extracts two accepting conversations with the same first move and then reconstructs the witness. Further, in applications the protocols can be made non-interactive employing the Fiat-Shamir heuristics [25] and then use the forking Lemma [41] for extraction in the random oracle model. These alternative definitions are well understood in the context of building efficient zero-knowledge proofs and can be ported into our setting. On the input generation stage. In an actual system, the input generator protocol P in , V in may abstract many parties and involve interactions between many participants. From a ZK security point of view, P in will comprise the "prover side" (i.e., the side that is interested in preserving zero-knowledge) and V in will comprise the "verifier side" (i.e., the side of the system that is interested in in preserving soundness). In a multi-party system, we will be interested in primarily two input generators: in the first one, P in will include only the prover and (if it exists) any party the prover trusts while V in will include all other participants. In the second one, V in will include the verifier and (if it exists) any party the verifier trusts, while P in will include all other participants. If a protocol is portable over both of these input generators then it can be safely deployed in the given system.
A central tool in our design is the notion of safeguard groups that we introduce next.
Safeguard Groups
A safeguard group is specified by a sampler algorithm S sg that on input 1 ν returns a tuple G, g, M, k, ζ ; where G is a description of an Abelian group that contains an implementation of G's binary operator, inverse computation, the encoding of 1 as well as the description of a polynomial-time group membership test that, given any string, it decides whether it is a proper encoding of a group element; g is a generator of G; M is an approximation of the order of g in G; and k is a security parameter that is related to the length of the order of small-order group elements. Note that we will use the same notation for the description of a group G and the group itself. Regarding the remaining elements of the tuple we have that g ∈ G, ζ ⊆ G, M ∈ N with further properties to be specified below.
Definition 4 A safeguard group sampler S sg satisfies the following (where
C1. The exponent of G is not divisible by the square of any k-bit integer.
C2. The order m of g in G has no k-bit integer divisor, and M satisfies that
C3. ζ contains only a polynomial (in ν) number of elements; they all have a known (say part of the subgroup description) k-bit integer order.
C4. Small-Order Property. It is hard to find k-bit order elements of G outside ζ. Formally, it holds that for all
C5. Strong-Root Property. Given z ∈ g it is hard to find e > 1 and u ∈ G such that u e = z. Formally, it holds that for all PPT A, Prob[(u e = z)∧(e > 1); u, e ← A(
We remark that properties C3-C4 are not really essential and can be dropped at the expense of loosing tightness in some of our proof reductions and notational presentation; we opt to enforce them as they make the presentation of the results more succinct and are easily satisfied for the known examples of safeguard groups.
Examples of Safeguard Groups
Example 1. A safeguard group distribution can be built as follows: sample n as a safe composite so that n = pq, p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1, where p , q are prime numbers larger than 2 k , set G = Z * n and let g be a generator of quadratic residues modulo n. Finally set ζ = {1, −1} and M = n 4 . Property C1 is immediate as the exponent of Z * n is 2p q . Observe also that the properties C2 and C3 are easily satisfied. Indeed, it is easy to see that M is sufficiently close to p q . Next observe that a violation of property C4 would mean the recovery of any other element that has a k-bit order outside {1, −1}; this would violate the factoring assumption (only the four square roots of 1 are k-bit order elements in Z * n based on our selection of n). Property C5 amounts to the Strong-RSA assumption with the target challenge being an arbitrary element of the quadratic residues; this is a variant of the strong RSA problem that has been utilized extensively in previous works (e.g., [22] ). Example 2. A second safeguard group is over the group G = Z * n 2 where n is sampled as before, i.e., n = pq, p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1, so that g is a generator of the subgroup of square n-th residues; as before we select p , q larger than 2 k and ζ = {1, −1}.
We remark that in both the above examples it is not necessary to select n as a safe composite, i.e., we may allow p and q to be composite numbers themselves as long as they have no small divisors (of k-bits). In practical settings where we will employ safeguard groups, the parameter k may be required to be in the range from 80 to 256 bits.
Properties of Safeguard Groups
In the first lemma below regarding safeguard groups we show that based on the properties of the safeguard group it is hard for an adversary to produce arbitrary powers of a chosen power of a group element. This lemma is an important building block of our general proof protocol. We remark that various restricted special case incarnations of this lemma have appeared in the literature (the most basic of which is referred to as Shamir's trick and corresponds to case (i) in the proof of lemma). These special incarnations are too restricted to be useful in our setting and thus there is need for putting forth the lemma that is formulated as follows:
Suppose that A is a PPT that given τ and a random z ∈ g returns y ∈ G and t, m ∈ Z such that y t = z m with 1 ≤ gcd(t, m) < |t| and t is a k-bit integer. It holds that the success probability of A is negligible in ν.
Proof. First assume w.l.o.g. that t is a positive integer (if not, set y ← y −1 mod n). We consider two cases according to δ = df gcd(t, m). Case (i). δ = 1. In this case we can compute α, β ∈ Z such that αt + βm = 1.
From this, in turn, we obtain:
and thus, we find the pair u, e = z α y β , t (note that t > 1 from the theorem's conditions). This provides a solution to the strong root problem violating property C5 of the safeguard group. Case (ii). Suppose that δ > 1. It follows that δ ≤ min{|t|, |m|} and if t = t δ and m = m δ , it holds that (y t ) δ = (z m ) δ . If gcd(δ, order(G)) = 1 then it is immediate that y t = z m and given that t > 1 (this is the case since δ < t by the lemma's statement) we are reduced to case (i). In the other case we have that there is a σ ∈ G such that σ δ = 1 and σ = 1 such that σ · y t = z m . Note that we can compute such a σ as σ = y −t z m . Furthermore, such a σ satisfies σ ∈ ζ due to property C4 and thus the order ρ of σ in G is known from the description of the safeguard group (property C3); (alternatively, note that given that σ δ = 1 it follows that ρ | δ and by factoring δ we can compute easily the order ρ of σ; this can be done efficiently in practice since δ is a k-bit integer). Next we consider the following two cases regarding δ = gcd(ρ, t ). Case (iia) δ > 1; in this case we show the following claim (utilizing property C1):
for element a and b from the group G, where the exponent of G has no square k-bit integer divisors and v is a k-bit integer that divides v .
Proof of claim. Let u be the exponent of G, u a = order(a), and u b = order(b). We know that v | u a | u and u b | u. Since v | u and v is a k-bit integer, based on the claim's condition we have that gcd(v, Based on the above claim, we have that given that the order of δ divides the order ρ of σ it follows that the order of σ · y t is also divisible by δ . This is a contradiction given that σ · y t = z m and z is an element of g which is a cyclic group with no k-bit divisors in its order (due to property C2).
Case (iib) δ = 1; in this case we can compute t ∈ Z such that t · t ≡ 1(modρ) and we can write σ · y t = (σ t · y) t = z m so we are reduced to case (i) again.
Our main result regarding safeguard groups is Lemma 7. We show that any adversary that is given any number of bases from the g subgroup of the safeguard group is incapable of producing an entirely arbitrary discrete-log representation of a power of his choosing within G. Before stating the main lemma, we show an auxiliary lemma. . Now consider the distribution of Y . The support of Y is {0, 1, . . . , π} where all elements are assigned probability B/A except element π that is assigned probability v/A. Based on this, the statistical distance between the distribution Y and the uniform distribution over {0, 1, . . . , π} can be seen to be less than Lemma 7 Let B 1 , . . . , B r ← R g , G, g, M, k, ζ ← S sg (1 ν ) be a safeguard group distribution, and let A be a PPT that on input G, g, M, k, ζ, B 1 , . . . , B r it outputs integers e 1 , . . . , e r , t and y ∈ G such that with probability α: |t| > 1 and r i=1 B e i i = y t where t is a k-bit number and ∃i : t | e i . Then the Strong-Root property is violated with probability at least α/(2r + 1) − η where η is a function negligible in ν.
Proof. First observe we may assume without loss of generality that t is positive since we can always set y = y −1 as the output of A. The sample space over which the probability α is taken is identified to the coin tosses of A and the random choices of B 1 , . . . , B r from g . Suppose that m is the order of g within G and M is the (public) approximation on m such that (M − m)/M is a negligible function. Observe that the random variable g x with x ← R [M ] is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over g ; in particular the distance of the two distributions is bounded by (M − m)/M .
Consider now the following experiment denoted by E.
, and simulate A on input g b 1 , . . . , g br . From Lemma 6 and the observation above it follows that b i mod m is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform over Z m and thus the elements B i = g b i for i = 1, . . . , r are statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over g r . Observe that the relation r i=1 B e i i = y t can be written as y t = g e 1 b 1 +...+erbr . Let δ = gcd(e 1 b 1 + . . . + e r b r , t). The sample space for the experiment E corresponds to the choices for b 1 , . . . , b r as well as the coin tosses for the simulation of A. We can split the sample space of E to the following events (i) E fail : the output of A fails to meet the output specifications (either, t = 1, or g
(ii) E div : the output of A meets the specifications except that it holds that for all i = 1, . . . , r, t | e i . (iii) E lt : all the specifications are met and δ < t. (iv) E eq : all the specifications are met and δ = t. Based on the assumption of the lemma we have that Prob[E lt ] + Prob[E eq ] = α (for simplicity we omit the negligible statistical distance η that exists between the executions of A and the experiment E and is bounded by r(M − m)/M ). Observe first that if the event E lt happens the result of the theorem will follow directly from Lemma 5 (by repeating the above with some value z instead of g above and using e 1 b 1 + . . . + e r b r as the exponent of z).
Next, let us consider the event E eq . The event E eq implies t | e 1 b 1 + . . . + e r b r . Observe that we can view the space where the event E eq belongs to as being comprised of tuples of the form (π 1 , . . . , π r , ρ) where π j = b j m and ρ is a sequence of coin tosses that fixes the randomness of A as well as the choice of b j (modm) for j = 1, . . . , r. Moreover, note that the output of A depends only on ρ and is independent of the choice of π 1 , . . . , π r . Consider the subset Ω of E eq for which it holds (π 1 , . . . , π r , ρ) ∈ Ω iff there exists j such that both tuples of the form (π 1 , . . . , π j−1 , π j ± 1, π j+1 , . . . , π r , ρ) do not belong in E eq . Claim 1. E eq = Ω. Proof of Claim 1. Let (π 1 , . . . , π r , ρ) ∈ E eq − Ω. Executing the experiment based on this sequence of random choices, we obtain e 1 , . . . , e r and t such that t | e 1 b 1 + . . (π 1 , . . . , π r , ρ) ∈ E eq − Ω it follows that some tuple of the form (π 1 ± 1, π 2 , . . . , π r , ρ) ∈ E eq . Because the behavior of A only depends on ρ it follows that for the same t, e 1 , . . . , e r it will hold t | e 1 ((π
Observe that the fact (π 1 , . . . , π r , ρ) ∈ Ω excludes at least one tuple of the form (π 1
Based on the above claims we obtain that Prob[E eq ] ≤ α(1 + 1/2r) −1 which implies Prob[E lt ] ≥ α(2r + 1) −1 which means that property C5 is violated with probability at least α/(2r + 1) − η where η ≤ r(M − m)/M a negligible function in ν.
The Portability of Generalized Schnorr Proofs
In this section we discuss the portability of Generalized Schnorr Proofs. In particular we will identify a wide class of input generators so that under the right conditions these protocols are portable. GSP-specs. A generalized Schnorr proof (GSP) operates on a statement t that involves a number of groups and group elements ("bases") with public and secret exponents. To any such statement t we will associate the following:
i. A set of symbolic variables denoted by X = {α 1 , . . . , α r } with |X | = r.
ii. A sequence of group descriptions G 1 , . . . , G z as well as the descriptions of z subgroups ζ 1 , . . . , ζ z of G 1 , . . . , G z respectively, so that the exponent of each ζ i is (at most) a k-bit integer. The description of the subgroup ζ i will be typically given as a list of elements (i.e., these subgroups are small). It may be the case that ζ i = {1}.
iii. The group elements A i,j ∈ G i for j = 0, . . . , r where A i,j will be the base for the variable α j in group G i .
iv. The range limits
Next we give an explicit syntax notation and semantics for specifying the language L that the prover wishes to convince the verifier the statement t belongs to. We define two languages L and L ext :
We will use the following syntax to refer to a proof of knowledge for the language L whose soundness is only ensured in the extended language L ext ; we call this notation a GSP-spec τ .
Note that left-hand side of the above notation (i.e., the first line) is the statement of the proof whereas the right-hand side (namely, the second line) is the actual (extended) statement that will be guaranteed to hold (recall Definition 2). Note that in the extended statement the ranges [L j , R j ] will be extended to [L ext j , R ext j ] and the unit element of the group is extended to be any element in the (small) subgroup ζ i for the i-th equation.
The specification allows for a wide range of proofs including polynomial relations among the secret and inequality statements of secrets. We refer to section 8 for a discussion on what is covered by this specification and how it can be extended, in particular to include also ∨-connectives or tighter ranges.
GSP input generators. A GSP input generator Π = P in , V in that is consistent with a GSP-spec τ is a two party protocol that determines the parameters: z (the number of groups), r (the number of symbolic variables), k (a parameter related to group selection and the soundness property) and whose public output t includes the description of all groups, bases and ranges of the GSP-spec as described in the items (i)-(iv) above.
The Generalized Schnorr Protocol Σ GSP τ . For any GSP-spec τ one can design a Sigma protocol based on Schnorr's proof by introducing appropriate range checking and compensating for the fact that groups of unknown order are used with computations over the integers.
The protocol is based on two parameters k, l for free variables α 1 , . . . , α r such that α j takes values in the range [L j , R j ]. Below we set m j = R j − L j . Suppose the prover is in possession of the witnesses x 1 , . . . , x r ; the prover selects first the random values t j ∈ R [−2 k+l m j , 2 k+l m j ] and computes the values B i = r j=1 A t j i,j . The prover terminates the first stage of computation by transmitting B 1 , . . . , B z . The verifier selects c ∈ R {0, 1} k and responds by sending c to the prover. The prover, in response computes the integers s j = t j −c·(x j −L j ) and sends them to the verifier. The verifier returns 1 if and only if for all j ∈ {1, . . . , r} it holds that s j ∈ [−2 k+l m j − (2 k − 1)m j , 2 k+l m j ] as well as for all i ∈ {1, . . . , z} it holds that B i ∈ G i and
The reader can also refer to figure 1 for the full description of the Σ GSP τ protocol given above.
Portability of Σ GSP
τ . We will next identify a class of input generators Π for a given GSP-spec τ over which Σ GSP τ is portable as a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. Recall that Π defines the respective inputs (t, w) for the prover and t for the verifier. We first describe the setting where some special care needs to be paid when arguing the security of Σ GSP τ . These settings involve variables that are "unsafe": Definition 8 (Unsafe Variables) For a GSP-spec τ , a symbolic variable α j ∈ X is called unsafe if it satisfies at least one of the following three conditions: (1) it is involved in an equation over a group G i over a base element that is of unknown order to the verifier (i.e., the order of the base is not included in the group's description); (2) the range [L j , R j ] is non-trivial (i.e., it is not the range (−∞, +∞) ); (3) the variable appears across various bases that have known but different order.
The presence of unsafe variables may introduce problems in the knowledge extraction argument and make the protocol fail the soundness property. Still, unsafe variables can be tolerated provided they appear in conjunction Protocol for a GSP-spec τ with free variables X = {α 1 , . . . , α r }. Security parameters: k, l ∈ N, Each variable α j takes values in the range [L j , R j ]; set m j = R j − L j P proves knowledge of the witness x = x 1 , . . . , x r with x j ∈ [L j , R j ].
−→ Verification for j ∈ {1, . . . , r} test:
for i ∈ {1, . . . , z} test: to safeguard groups (cf. Definition 4). The following definition defines input-generators that are suitable for the Σ ext τ protocol in the presence of unsafe variables. In a nutshell it says that for a GSP-input generator protocol Π, a certain group will be called a safeguard group for Π as long as there exists a simulator that playing the role of the verifier, it can "plug-in" a safeguard group generated by S sg in black-box fashion in the interaction with P in without P in noticing, even if P in is acting adversarially.
Definition 9
For any GSP-input-generator protocol Π = P in , V in , a group G i and the bases A i,j 1 , . . . , A i,jv ∈ G i will be called respectively a safeguard group for Π and its safeguard bases there exists a polynomial-time simulator S V s.t. for any adversarial party P * in in the protocol Π, S V receives as input G, g, M, k, ζ, g 1 , . . . , g v where G, g, M, k, ζ ← S sg (1 ν ) and g = g s with s ¢ ← [M ], and satisfies the property that the input t produced by the interaction of P * in and S V contains a group G i and bases A i,j 1 , . . . , A i,jv that satisfy G i = G and A i,j 1 = g 1 , . . . , A i,jv = g v and the view of P * in when interacting with V in is indistinguishable from the view of P * in when interacting with S V . Theorem 10 (Portability of Generalized Schnorr Proofs) Let τ be a GSP-spec. The protocol Σ GSP τ is portable for honest verifiers, for all input generators Π consistent with τ provided that (I) the generated input t ∈ L in has no unsafe variable, or (II) the five following conditions hold: (i) Each unsafe variable appears at least once as an exponent over a safeguard base. (ii) There is an ordering i 1 , . . . , i z of all the equations so that (1) i 1 is a safeguarding equation with all its free variables over safeguard bases, and (2) in safeguarding equation i w for w > 1 it holds that all free variables of equation i w appear over safeguard bases or have appeared at least once in a previous safeguarding equation. (iii) If G i is a safeguard group then it has description G i , g i , M i , k, ζ i (i.e., all safeguard groups share the same k).
An equation
The knowledge error κ is c · (2 −k + r · Adv root ) for a suitable c ∈ R and the zero-knowledge distance is = r · 2 −l .
Proof. Without loss of generality we will focus on the case where all variables α 1 , . . . , α r are unsafe; the case where variables are mixed is a straightforward extension. We first prove completeness. Observe that given that c ∈ {0, 1} k and
Based on this we have for all i = 1, . . . , z,
Regarding soundness, we first determine K in : the knowledge extractor at the input generation stage is the simulator S V that can play the role of the verifier and "plug-in" the safeguard groups that are required in the statement of the theorem. Then, based on Definition 9, the knowledge extractor can induce the proper safeguard distribution in the input generation stage for any adversarial prover P * in . After this step, we need to construct the knowledge extractor K that will be based on the given adversarial prover P * and should operate in polynomialtime in (π P * in ,P * − κ) −1 with success at least linear in π P * in ,P * . We construct K as follows: it simulates P * and V and rewinds P * to the point prior to the selection of the challenge (giving a new challenge each time) a number of 2ν · (π P * in ,P * − 2 −k − (2r + 1)(Adv root + η)) −1 times until it obtains two accepting interactions, denoted as B 1 , . . . , B z , c, s 1 , . . . , s r , B 1 , . . . , B z , c * , s * 1 , . . . , s * r , between the P * and the honest verifier that have the same first move B 1 , . . . , B z . If no such interactions are determined K terminates with failure. We next show how based on such two interactions we can reconstruct the witnesses.
Let us consider the i-th relation of the GSP. Due to the fact that both conversations are accepting we have
Which can be rewritten as
where ∆c = c * − c, ∆s j = s j − s * j . Recall that it holds that A i,j = 1 whenever α j does not appear in the i-th equation.
Based on a standard lemma (cf. Lemma 15), we know that there is a fraction π P * in ,π * /2 of accepting conversations for which it is possible to rewind and to obtain a second accepting conversation with the same first move with probability π P * in ,π * /2 (in the conditional space). Each time K performs a rewinding and obtains an accepting second conversation we can distinguish three events in the conditional space: (i) The event EQ that corresponds to ∆c = 0 (we note that this happens with probability 2 −k ); (ii) The event NDIV that corresponds to the case there is some j ∈ {1, . . . , r} so that α j is an unsafe variable for which it is not true that ∆c | ∆s j : (iii) The event SUCC that hits a second accepting conversation that satisfies ∆c | ∆s j for all j = 1, . . . , r. The event SUCC happens with probability at least π P * in ,π * /2 − 2 −k − γ where γ is an upper bound on the probability of the event NDIV. We proceed next to bound γ.
Given that there are j ∈ {1, . . . , r} for which it holds that ∆c does not divide ∆s j let us order all such j following the order they appear in the safeguarding equations according to their ordering suggested by property II(ii) of the theorem i 1 , . . . , i z . Without loss of generality let j be the first index in this ordering and let i be the safeguarding equation for which α j appears over a safeguard base. If it holds that i = 1 then we know that α j appears over a safeguard base and all other variables present in the equation also appear over safeguard bases. On the other hand if i > 1 it holds that any variable α j of i which does not appear over a safeguard base has already appeared in the equations i 1 , . . . , i − 1 and thus it must be the case that ∆c divides ∆s j (otherwise we would have selected j instead of j). These arguments suggest that no matter what, we can isolate a single safeguarding equation for which all unsafe variables that have not appeared before appear over safeguard bases and for one of them, denoted α j , it holds that ∆c does not divide ∆s j . This setting enables us to utilize Lemma 7 to show that the strong root property is violated. This will provide a bound for the probability γ. We proceed as follows.
Suppose that γ ≥ (2r + 1)(Adv root + η)(1 − ) −1 , where is a negligible function in ν. We can turn the entire prover -verifier simulation into an algorithm A that solves the problem stated in Lemma 7 as follows: we restart the prover -verifier interaction (from the input generation stage) plugging on behalf of the verifier (using K in ) the safeguard group distribution. We repeat the first stage a number of Ω(π −1 P * in ,π * · ν) times to obtain an accepting conversation with overwhelming probability in ν. Then we perform a single rewinding to obtain a second accepting conversation with probability γ. It follows that with probability (1 − )γ we obtain the result postulated in the statement of Lemma 7 where α = (1 − )γ. Based on this we have that (1 − )γ/(2r + 1) − η ≤ Adv root which is a contradiction to the lower bound of γ postulated in the beginning of the paragraph. Therefore γ ≤ (Adv root + η)(2r + 1)(1 − ) −1 which implies that γ ≤ (Adv root + η)(2r + 1)(1 + ) where is negligible in ν.
Based on the above we derive that with probability (π P * in ,π * /2 − 2 −k − (Adv root + η)(2r + 1)(1 + )) the second conversation will be successful and satisfy that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , r} : ∆c | ∆s j . In such case it follows that we can set x j = ∆s j ∆c + L j (calculated over Z) as the witness value for the variable α j . Indeed observe that for those values it holds that
where σ i is an at most k-bit order element of the safeguard group G i , since σ ∆c i = G i 1 where ∆c is a k-bit number. Moreover observe that because s , s
and, as a result, ∆s ∆c ∈ [−2 k+l+2 m , 2 k+l+2 m ] (in fact it can be argued that with high probability the range would be much tighter but the above is enough for the result as stated). Therefore x , as reconstructed above, will belong to [L − 2 k+l+2 m , L + 2 k+l+2 m ] and the reconstructed witnesses satisfies the stated range constraint.
Given that we repeat the rewinding 2ν(π P * in ,π * /2 − 2 −k − (2r + 1)(Adv root + η)(1 + )) −1 times we have that with overwhelming probability in ν we will derive a second accepting conversation in the conditional space where the first conversation is accepting and suitable (per Lemma 15) . Given that a suitable initial accepting conversation is derived with probability π P * in ,π * /2 the soundness of the protocol follows assuming knowledge error κ = 2(2 −k + (2r + 1)(Adv root + η)(1 + )) (where both η and are negligible functions in ν). This completes the proof of soundness.
Regarding statistical zero-knowledge for honest verifiers, the simulator at the input generation stage S in simply simulates the prover P in . Subsequently after the input generation stage, for the honest verifier case (i.e., V * simulates V and returns all tapes including the view of V * in ) we define the simulator S that operates as follows: it selects c ∈ R {0, 1} k and for = 1, . . . , r,ŝ w ← R [−2 k+l m, 2 k+l m] and it computes for i = 1, . . . , z the valueŝ
The simulator outputs the transcript B 1 , . . . ,B z , c,ŝ 1 , . . . ,ŝ r . Then we need to show that the simulated transcripts are statistically indistinguishable from transcripts that are generated in conversations between the honest prover and the honest verifier. This boils down to calculating the statistical distance between the random variable s computed as t − c(x − L ) for a fixed x ∈ [L , R ] and t ∈ R [−2 k+l m, 2 k+l m] and c ∈ R {0, 1} k to the random variableŝ ∈ R [−2 k+l m, 2 k+l m]. We prove the following claim:
Claim. Consider a fixed x ∈ [L, R] with m = R − L and the random variables t ∈ R [−2 k+l m, 2 k+l m], c ∈ R {0, 1} k . The statistical distance of the random variableŝ = t − c(x − L) from the random variable s ∈ R [−2 k+l m, 2 k+l m] is less than 2 −l .
Proof of Claim. We will denote by D a the distribution of the random variable s and by D b the distribution of s = t − c(x − L). Assume that the support of the two random variables is Z.
• Regarding D a observe that a certain s 0 in [−2 k+l m, 2 k+l m] has probability of being selected equal to 1 1+2 k+l+1 m (uniform probability distribution). Any s 0 ∈ [−2 k+l m, 2 k+l m] has probability 0.
• Regarding D b observe that a certain s 0 has the following probabilities of being selected:
1. For each s 0 ∈ [−2 k+l m, 2 k+l m − (2 k − 1)m] and for each of the 2 k different c 0 ∈ {0, 1} k we can find a unique t 0 such that s 0 = t 0 − c 0 x, as a result the probability of obtaining the given s 0 according to ].
3. For the remaining s 0 < −2 k+l m − (2 k − 1)m and s 0 > 2 k+l m the probability of selecting them according to D b is equal to 0.
It is clear from the above that the absolute difference between the probability of a certain s 0 according to D b and D a is 0 for the integer ranges of cases 1 and 3 above. The distributions D a and D b will accumulate some statistical distance though due to their different behavior for values s 0 that belong to the integer range specified in item 2. In this case, for a specific s 0 , distribution D a assigns probability either 0 or
whereas distribution D b assigns probability that belongs in the real interval [0,
]. Clearly, in the worst case for each specific s 0 the absolute difference will be
. The number of elements s 0 of case 2, are 2·(2 k −1)m thus it follows that the statistical distance of the distributions D a and D b cannot be greater than
This completes the proof of the claim.
With a standard application of the triangular inequality we conclude that the statistical distance of our simulator is r2 −l .
Example. Suppose that V in selects an RSA-modulus n which is a multiple of two safe primes, a quadratic residue base g ∈ Z * n as well as h ¢ ← g . V in transmits n, g, h to P in . In turn, P in sends y = g u h v mod n where u
] and v ∈ [2 e ] for some e ∈ N. The input 1 t generated by P in , V in in this case is the vector n, g, h, y . Suppose now that the prover P wishes to demonstrate to the verifier V that she knows u, v in their respective ranges such that y = g u h v mod n. It is easy to see that Z * n can play the role of a safeguard group for the input generator described above with ζ = {−1, +1} and that the conditions of Theorem 10 are satisfied, thus the protocol Σ GSP τ can be used to ensure to V that y = ±g u h v mod n and u ∈ [−E u ,
Unconditionally Portable Protocols for GSP-specs
Theorem 10 of the previous section describes a class of input-generators for which the generalized Schnorr proof protocol can be used in a safe way. Nevertheless, it may be very well the case that we would like to use a proof for a GSP-spec outside this class of input generators. In the remaining of the section we describe an efficient protocol enhancement to the basic generalized Schnorr protocol that is unconditionally portable. The Σ ext,+ τ protocol. Consider any input generator Π for which Theorem 10 does not apply, i.e., (Π, Σ ext τ ) is not a zero-knowledge proof over Π. We next show one modification of Σ ext τ into a protocol Σ ext+ τ so that Σ ext+ τ is a protocol that is universally portable as a zero-knowledge proof.
The protocol Σ ext+ τ operates as follows: The verifier first selects a safeguard group Z * n , g, M = n/4 , k, V = {−1, 1} where g = QR(n) together with a number of safeguard bases g 1 , . . . , g u ∈ g where u is the number of variables that are unsafe. We will denote the discrete-logarithm values of g base g as ρ . The verifier also selects a prime P such that (P −1)/2 is also prime and satisfies (P −1)/2 > n as well as two elements of order (P −1)/2 in Z * P denoted by G, H where H is randomly selected from G . When these elements are received the prover will check that P, (P −1)/2 ∈ Prime, (P −1)/2 > n and that G, H ∈ QR(P ) (i.e., that H ∈ G ). We denote Adv DLOG an upper bound on the probability that any polynomial-time bounded algorithm has in returning log G (H) given G, H, P . Next, the prover computes a commitment of the form C = g r g x 1 1 . . . g xu u (modn) (which is an extended Pedersen commitment over the safeguard group); note that r ¢ ← [2 l+3 M ] where l is the security parameter related to the zero-knowledge distance and x 1 , . . . , x u are the witnesses of P . Intuitively, what will happen next can be interpreted as follows: the prover and the verifier will include in the GSP-spec τ the safeguarding equation
as one of the equations that are needed to be shown (we call the extended GSP-spec τ + ) but the prover will not reveal C. This is because the parameters of the safeguard group were selected by the verifier and thus the prover is at risk of revealing some information about the witnesses.
Instead, the (P, V ) protocol interaction for τ + will be modified as follows: the prover P will make a commitment ψ 1 to the value C denoted by ψ 1 = G r * H C mod P . Similarly, the prover P will not submit the value B 0 (that corresponds to the commitment equation (C = g r g
; instead it will submit a commitment ψ 2 = G r * 0 H B 0 mod P . We call ψ = (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ). Next, the prover P will need to show that ψ is well-formed; this is easy as ψ 1 , ψ 2 are Pedersen commitments, so it suffices to prove knowledge of r * and C in ψ 1 and prove knowledge of r * 0 and B 0 in ψ 2 . We denote the Σ proof for the ψ commitment as com ψ , c, res ψ . These additional proofs can be composed in parallel AND composition with the GSP protocol Σ GSP τ and do not incur any additional round complexity. After the verifier receives all values and accepts the proofs (except for the equation over the safeguard group), it submits to the prover the values ρ 1 , . . . , ρ u who in turn checks whether g = g ρ . In this case, the prover opens the commitments ψ 1 , ψ 2 , and now the verifier is able to complete the verification as described in the Σ ext τ protocol. We illustrate the transformation in figure 2. Remark. This transformation generalizes and improves the setting of the Σ + proof method introduced in [5] ; it obviates the need of random oracles (their soundness argument was in the random oracle model). We note that if the number of rounds is at premium then it is possible to reduce them to 3 by giving up on other aspects of the protocol in terms of security or efficiency. Specifically, one can either have the verifier demonstrate to the prover that the safeguard group is properly selected in an "offline" stage (that will not be counting towards the rounds of the actual protocol) or assuming the existence of an auxiliary input that is honestly distributed (an approach shown in [4] ).
We next prove our protocol secure for a type of "partly honest" verifiers that may operate maliciously in the safeguard group selection (i.e., the first move of the Σ ext+ τ protocol) but still select the challenge honestly (in the third move of the protocol). We choose to do this for ease of presentation as there are standard techniques that can be applied to port the protocol to the entirely malicious verifier setting (much like how an honest verifier zero-knowledge protocol can be ported to the zero-knowledge setting).
Theorem 11
For any GSP-spec τ and any consistent input generator Π, the protocol Σ ext,+ τ is an (unconditionally portable) zero-knowledge proof of knowledge over Π against partly honest verifiers for the same L ext , R ext parameters as Theorem 10, knowledge error κ = c(2 −k + Adv DLOG + r · Adv root ) for some c ∈ R and zero-knowledge distance (r + 1)2 −l .
Proof. It is easy to see that the Σ ext+ τ protoocol satisfies completeness: this stems from the completeness of the underlying Σ ext τ protocol and the fact that the AND-composition with the proof of knowledge of the Pedersen commitment preserves completeness.
Next we consider soundness. We will follow a similar approach to the one in Theorem 10. The major hurdle is to show that given two accepting conversations of the Σ ext+ τ protocol distributed according to the way the simulator produces them using rewinding, we can derive two accepting conversations of the underlying Σ ext τ + protocol and thus utilize the proof of Theorem 10.
Observe the following: the two accepting conversations can be parsed to obtain the values: ψ 1 , ψ 2 , B 1 , . . . , B z , c, s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s r , ρ 1 , . . . , ρ u , C, B 0 and ψ 1 , ψ 2 , B 1 , . . . , B z , c * , s * 0 , s * 1 , . . . , s * r , ρ 1 , . . . , ρ u , C * , B * 0 . Note that in both cases it holds that the commitment was successfully opened by the malicious prover. From these two conversations we can derive the two accepting conversations for τ + (that includes in the statement the commitment C) as long as C = C * and B 0 = B * 0 . Denote by NEG the event that B 0 = B * 0 or C = C * holds. If this is the case it holds that the binding property of the underlying commitment is broken: it follows that in such case we may turn the prover and the knowledge extractor into an algorithm that solves the discrete-logarithm problem over the group Z * P . This is so, as we can employ an instance of discrete-log problem as the parameters of the Pedersen commitment scheme and subsequently use the fact that the commitment is opened in two different ways to solve the discrete-logarithm problem.
Regarding the zero-knowledge property we prove the following: first, during the input generation stage V * in may operate malicious. Then, we consider a partly honest verifier that operates in two distinct stages V * 1 and V * 2 . The verifier first stage V * 1 produces the distribution of the safeguard group as well as some auxiliary input for V * 2 . Then, V * 2 operates as the honest verifier in the Σ ext+ τ : it receives the ψ, com ψ , B 1 , . . . , B z values, selects c and then assuming that the auxiliary input by V * 1 equals the discrete logarithms of g 1 , . . . , g u base g, it transmits these values to the prover, otherwise it terminates failing. We show that we can simulate the view of such verifier without access to the witness information possessed by the prover. In the proof we will utilize the honest verifier zero-knowledge simulator that was described in Theorem 10. Nevertheless, we also have to simulate the commitments ψ 1 , ψ 2 which is a delicate part of the zero-knowledge argument: indeed given that the safeguard group is selected by the verifier, these values can leak information about the witnesses. Here we utilize the perfect hiding property of the Pedersen commitment and the ψ 1 , ψ 2 values are selected at random over Z * P . Then we need to show that we can simulate the value C. We note that the value C is revealed only when the discrete-logarithms ρ 1 , . . . , ρ u have been revealed by the verifier. This suggests that all g 1 , . . . , g u belong to g . To finish the proof we need to show that for any a ∈ g , the random variable g r · a mod n is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform over g . Recall that the choice of the safeguard group is assumed to be adversarial. Moreover, the value M = n/4 is claimed to be an upper bound to the order m of g within Z * n with the property (M − m)/M is a negligible function. Note that if n is selected honestly it holds that m = p q with n = (2p + 1)(2q + 1). Given that a ∈ g it holds that a = g α and we have that g r · a = g r+α mod m . It remains to show that r + α mod m is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over Z m . From Lemma 6 we have that the distance is at most v/(2 l+3 M ) where v = 2 l M mod m < m. Given that m ≤ n necessarily, the highest possible value for the statistical distance is n/(2 l+3 M ) ≤ 2 −l−1 . Based on this it follows that we can simulate C by simply selecting it at random from g which in turn can be simulated by selecting g r with r
The remaining of the proof follows easily from the proof of Theorem 10.
Demonstrative Applications
Application #1. Our first application deals with the group-signature/identity-escrow protocol of Ateniese et al. [1] whose main zero-knowledge protocol was recently shown by Cao to have a problem in a setting where the setup of the system is not trusted (cf. [17] where this was presented as an attack against the group signature). Putting the proof system of [1] into our framework highlights the exact circumstances that may permit an attack to be mounted, as well as the conditions under which the attack is not relevant; it should be noted that the original paper [1] anticipated issues of the kind of [17] (but without elaborating on them, see [2] for a rebutal of Cao's attack).
In a group signature there are three basic entities: the user, the group manager GM, and the verifier. The GM produces the values n, a, a 0 , g, h, y where a, a 0 , g, h, y ∈ Z * n ; note that Z * n is selected in a way consistent with a safeguard group (cf. Definition 4). Subsequently the user interacts with the GM to obtain values A, e, x such that A e = a 0 a x (modn) where e ∈ Γ, x ∈ Λ and Γ, Λ are appropriately selected disjoint integral ranges. Subsequently, the user selects T 1 = Ay w , T 2 = g w , T 3 = g e h w and issues a signature based on a proof protocol w.r.t. T 1 , T 2 , T 3 . Viewing the protocol of [1] in our context, the user acts as a prover on a GSP-spec of the following form:
The ranges Γ ext , Λ ext are extended integral ranges based on Γ, Λ as defined in Theorem 10 and the ζ i are elements of small order. Note that the GSP-spec makes explicit the fact that the values T 1 , T 2 , T 3 are not guaranteed to be perfectly proper (e.g., as they may be multiplied by an element of small order such as −1 without the verifier necessarily catching this). In order to pair the above with the GSP protocol one should specify how the joint input to the proof n, a, a 0 , g, h, y is generated with respect to the prover and verifier. Note that the GSP-spec contains unsafe variables (as all variables e, x, w, w 0 are over a hidden order group). In order to obtain a suitable protocol we have to determine whether the GSP-input is safe or not (and then apply the results of the previous section accordingly). We note that the proof protocol presented in [1] is consistent with the protocol of Theorem 10 and thus their effective assumption is that the conditions of Theorem 10 hold. The conditions are indeed true in the setting where the prover does not collaborate with the GM (i.e., the values n, g, h, a, y are selected appropriately: n defines a safeguard group and g, h, a, y are safeguard bases, and ζ i = ±1 as n is chosen to be a safe prime product) and we can thus use Theorem 10 to argue the security of the signature protocol of [1] . The basis for the attack of Cao [17] is exactly the setting where the prover is allowed to select the safeguard bases and is clear that this would be beyond what the setting of [1] anticipates. As long as the prover does not collaborate with the GM the GSP-input is properly generated and the protocol of [1] is a zero-knowledge proof. Note that this does not mean that the proof protocol P, V stemming from theorem 10 ceases to be useful when the there is collaboration between the prover and the GM 2 .
The above discussion illustrates how our framework clarifies the exact security properties preserved in the [1] .
Application #2. Chan et al. presented in [18] an off-line divisible e-cash scheme. There are three active parties in an e-cash scheme: the user, the bank and the merchant. In [18] , for parameters g 1 , g 2 ∈ Z * P where P ∈ Prime, in two different stages of the system the user reveals to the bank the value I = g For the security proof of [18] to go through the user should be restricted so that log g 1 (I) · log g 2 (Y ) = N (over Z) (among other requirements, here we focus only on aspects of the paper related to zero-knowledge proofs).
If one employs standard discrete logarithm zero-knowledge proofs, the difficulty is that the relation is only ensured over Z Q (where Q is the order g 1 , g 2 ). Note that the merchant can check that N < Q nevertheless for the modular relation to imply the relation over the integers, it should hold that log g 1 (I) < T and log g 2 (Y ) < T where T is an integer such that 2T < Q. In a nutshell in [18] the following GSP-spec needs to be implemented for some properly selected integers T 0 , T 1 : (this spec applies to the value I, a similar GSP-spec is required for Y ). Note that there is no need that the integral ranges satisfy [T 0 , T 1 ] = [T 0 , T 1 ]; the only requirements are that 0 < T 0 , 2T 1 < Q and the selection of prime numbers p, q from the range [T 0 , T 1 ] results in a hard to factor modulus n. Given the above setting, it is clear that the variable w is unsafe in the given GSP-spec (cf. Definition 8). This fact went unnoticed originally in [18] (the mistake was pointed out later in the full version of the paper and a possible sketch for a solution was presented without a proof of security). Using our framework it follows easily that the security analysis of [18] can be completed by applying the Σ + transformation of the previous section.
Extensions
Let us conclude with a number of extensions that we will discuss here only briefly; we refer to future version of this paper for more information.
In the description of the protocols derived from GSP-specs, the verifier chooses the challenge c from the set {0, 1} k , where k is a security parameter. Now, there is a couple of modes in which the protocol can be executed that influence the actual choice of k. For instance, if the protocol is run as described and the running time of the knowledge extractor shall be polynomial in some security parameter k , then k = Θ(k ) and the protocol needs to be repeated O(k ) times if the soundness error should be negligible in k . In fact, the situation is the same as for the well-known Σ protocols [20] , of which the Schnorr identification protocol is an example. That is, all modes applicable to Σ-protocols are also applicable to our protocols. In particular, all the standard techniques to transform a Σ-protocol, e.g., into one where k can be linear in the security parameter and allow for so-called on-line knowledge extractors (e.g., [23, 26] ).
Another extension of our GSP-spec syntax language is w.r.t. to the logical statements of operators. At present our GSP-specs consider the combination of terms with the ∧ operator only. However, using known techniques [21, 42] , different instances of our protocols can be combined in such a way that the prover can show that (only) one of the instances holds while not revealing which one, i.e., one can combine the instances with the ∨ operator. Basically, the current GSP-specs are considered atomic protocols which, e.g., using [21] can be connected by ∧-and ∨-connectives.
Our syntax specification already allows one to specify protocols that prove for instance that log g y = log h z even in case g and h generate different groups (but have the same order), polynomial relations among secrets, and negations, e.g., log g y = log h z. Indeed, there exist different possibilities of doing this which vary in their efficiency. the basic idea here is to build (additional) bases A i,j according to the polynomial equations that are going to be proved. In the current specification it is necessary to formulate these protocols explicitly, e.g., using the known mechanisms provided in [16, 15, 8] ).
We note that for proving that a (safeguarded) secret log g y lies in some interval, say [L, R], there are also various ways one can do this. In this paper we employ a "natural" way which does not incur any additional computations for the verifier or the prover. The drawback of this approach is that it is not tight: the proof only guarantees that log g y lies in a somewhat larger interval, i.e., [L ext , R ext ]. While this is sufficient in many settings, our GSP-specs allow for the specification of protocols that achieve tight interval proofs. One often employed method was proposed by Boudot in his conference talk [7] and described by Lipmaa [36] : The idea here is to reduce such a proof to polynomial equations (i.e., to a proof that log g y − L and R − log g y are both the sum of four squares and therefore positive). For unsafe variables, Camenisch, Chaabouni, and Shelat [13] propose to have the verifier (or some trusted) parties to publish signatures on all values in the interval and then the prover to show that she possesses a signature on her secret -hence it must lie in the interval. An alternative interval proof method is to commit to all the bits of the secret and then 1) prove that the commitments are indeed bits and 2) they are the bits of the secret (but of course this technique incurs a linear length expansion in the length of the proof). Schoenmakers [45] generalizes this method from binary digits to u-ary digits that are committed to by the prover.
